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The death penalty raises serious questions regarding the unequal and 
arbitrary application of the law. Indeed, the appropriateness of a death 
penalty verdict has long been considered as relying on myriad elements, 
as indicated in the Model Penal Code, drafted by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1959. The code states “the factors which determine whether the 
sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in particular cases are too 
complex to be compressed within the limits of a simple formula.”1 Using 
a similar rationale, in the case McGautha v. California, the Supreme Court 
held that the jury did not need to follow defined guidelines that could have 
limited the scope of elements of fundamental importance.2 However, this 
trend was reversed in the early 1970s in Furman v. Georgia, which an-
nulled all existing penalty laws.3 The Furman Court asserted, in a lengthy 
decision comprised of nine separate opinions, the necessity of guiding the 
jury’s discretion. Fundamental to this guidance of capital punishment are 
the principles of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment 
and due process in the Fourteenth Amendment as set forth in Lockett v. 
Ohio.4 As Justice Stevens stated elsewhere, the death sentence “is the one 
punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally 
understand such rules,”5 but is instead an ethical judgment expressing the 
conscience of the community as to whether “an individual has lost his 
moral entitlement to live.”6 
* PhD in Political Science; Assistant Professor, Institut Champollion/ Institut Maurice Hauriou (Uni-
versité Toulouse Capitole), France. 
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 at 71 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) (quoting Royal
Commn. on Cap. Punishment, Report 498) (1953). 
2. 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971).
3. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
4. 438 U.S. 586, 598 (1978).
5. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468–69 (1984). 
6. Symposium: Capital Jury: Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119 (2004). 
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A death penalty “decision must occur past the point to which legal-
istic reasoning can” be applied, since the death penalty exceeds the thresh-
old of law and relates to arguments beyond it, among which there are sev-
eral fundamental political elements.7 The advent of the neoliberal revival 
of the 1970s, first as a new ideology emphasizing the value of free market 
competition, and then as a policy model and practice of government, has 
had a significant impact on the consideration of individuals within society. 
Lockett v. Ohio is part of this context, setting the stage for a societal mu-
tation featuring a revaluation of the individual and his or her fundamental 
freedoms within a certain consensus outlined by the Supreme Court, and 
in this case its legacy. Still, a fissure has emerged in the interpretation of 
the Lockett ruling among the Justices: the arbitrary aspect of mitigating 
factors divided the Court. Political elements have influenced and built 
upon the jurisprudence of this judgment and its legacy, both at the consti-
tutional and national levels, with an emphasis on states that have particu-
larly changed their position on this issue in their jurisprudence. These 
states have followed a Supreme Court that is internally and locally chal-
lenged by the Lockett ruling and have opened new perspectives and issues. 
I. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: LOCKETT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT 
CONSENSUS 
The first part of this article aims to contextualize Lockett v. Ohio in 
relation to the changes that neoliberalism has brought about in American 
society by emphasizing the notion of individual responsibility. This no-
tion has been celebrated in political discourse, in the face of the State los-
ing its economic authority and replacing its authority in the security do-
main with the prism of a political discourse crystallizing these elements. 
The economic appeal of the commutation of a death sentence to life im-
prisonment has generated greed and a heightened political focus on the 
capital sentence decisions. 
As far as legal theory is concerned, the corollary of the concept of 
neoliberalism in relation to the death penalty can find support in different 
legal camps even though it is more likely to be present in neo-conserva-
tism. From Bruce Ackerman’s perspective, the issue is not liberalism v. 
conservatism, but conservatism v. neoconservatism, the latter having its 
7. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Colloquy: Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1047, 1048–49 (1991). 
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triumph confirmed by President Reagan’s selections or stealth appoint-
ments.8 It is on the basis of these elements that the second part of the ar-
ticle will analyze the Lockett case law and legacy during the following 
four decades that defined its interpretation and reduced the use and prac-
tice of the death penalty, by establishing mitigating factors. 
A. Neoliberalism: From Exogenous to Endogenous Factors 
In order to fully understand the Lockett Court and its Justices, it is 
essential to appreciate the political context in which the Court functioned. 
Prior to the appointment of Chief Justice Burger, liberal democrats domi-
nated from 1932-1968, with one exception during Eisenhower’s two 
terms. Eisenhower’s success was not really that of the Republican party. 
Rather, it was an idiosyncratic accomplishment resulting from his lack of 
previous political affiliation and his skills as a military commander. Thus, 
Democratic liberalism mostly dominated the political scene, particularly 
when it came to Congress. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had a natural 
inclination towards such ideals, especially under the Warren Court. At the 
same time the homicide rate in the United States, more than doubled from 
1957 to 1980, increasing from 4 to 10.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabit-
ants.9 The crime rate increased in all domains from petty theft to first-
degree murder. Between 1964 and 1974 alone, the U.S. homicide rate 
nearly doubled to 9.8 per 100,000 people.10 
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, the flood 
of violence had a major impact on American society and transformed the 
political scene while impacting institutions and their policies. In the 1960s 
the issue of violence became a cornerstone of public debate. During this 
decade, a paradox arose: while crime increased, punishment did not. The 
probability of a crime being resolved by an arrest went from 10% to 2%.11 
That is, it became five times less likely for a crime to be punished.12 The 
war on poverty led by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson can be seen as an 
interventionist approach with the federal state taking over the prerogatives 
of local actors. Such an approach aligned with the liberal legacy of the 
8. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1169 (1988). 
9. James Alan Fox et al., Homicide Trends in the U.S., U.S. BUREAU OF STATISTICS (2007), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf. [https://perma.cc/ZNZ9-ASGB]. 
10. Id. 
11. See James Q. Wilson & Richard J. Herrnstein, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 424-25 (1985); 
Franklin E. Zimring, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 47 fig. 3.2 (2007). 
12. See Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in DO 
PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 6 (Steven Raphael & 
Michael A. Stoll eds., 2008).  
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1930s, namely President Roosevelt’s New Deal. The liberal intervention-
ist policy of the Democrats in the 1960s focused on targeted policies. For 
instance, the Great Society represented a set of domestic programs under 
the Democratic administration of President Johnson seeking to tackle ra-
cial inequalities and poverty.13 Johnson’s first public reference to the 
“Great Society” took place during a speech to students on May 7, 1964, 
at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio: “And with your courage and with 
your compassion and your desire, we will build a Great Society. It is a 
society where no child will go unfed, and no youngster will go un-
schooled.”14 Johnson’s programs outlined the need to address the root 
causes of crime. 
The 1960s brought about a pendulum swing in views regarding so-
cial issues, particularly in terms of how to deal with crime. The 1960s 
became a decade of transformational change and federal activism. The 
political wars between liberals and conservatives caused angry divisions 
over law and order. Even though Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of 
Arizona lost the 1964 presidential election to Democratic liberal Lyndon 
Johnson, his campaign and discourse paved the way for Ronald Reagan’s 
new conservatism (or neoliberalism) in 1980. Thus, the 1960s led to the 
emergence of political debate on the issue of public order in the face of 
growing crime. The political spectrum became divided into two antago-
nistic postures regarding how to eradicate crime. 
On the one hand, the Democratic Party sought to tackle deterministic 
factors, such as poverty and discrimination, in order to counter the crime 
wave phenomenon. By comparison, the Republicans promoted a more pu-
nitive approach, in which strengthening the police state took a prominent 
position in the political discourse. The end of the 1960s saw the election 
of Republican Richard Nixon in a time characterized by polarization of 
the electorate. This time period represents a major political realignment. 
Southern states fell into the conservative fold when they had been a solid 
bastion of Democrats in past decades. A political breakthrough in the sun-
belt states significantly impacted the Republican approach to violence, re-
inforcing a conservative perspective. There began a public association be-
tween crime and the African American community in a society 
experimenting with desegregation. A growing proportion of the white 
13. See Elizabeth Hinton; “A War within Our Own Boundaries”: Lyndon Johnson’s Great So-
ciety and the Rise of the Carceral State, 102 J. OF AM. HISTORY 100, 100-12, (June 2015); also see 
CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 280 
(1992). 
14. President Johnson, Remarks in Athens at the Ohio University, (May 7, 1964) http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26225 [https://perma.cc/B5U8-Q6RJ]. 
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population began to assign responsibility for crime to the African Ameri-
can population. Meanwhile, the rise in national crime rates paralleled an 
exceptional period in which punishments for many crimes were easing. 
At the Supreme Court level, a series of landmark decisions charac-
terized by judicial activism under the Warren Court left an unprecedented 
legacy in civil rights and liberties while restricting police authority and 
expanding the rights of the accused.15 Conservative critics began charging 
the Court with being soft on crime. As for the American Bar Foundation, 
its research emphasized the need to avoid arbitrary power with ideas of 
uniformity, neutrality, and proceduralism in law enforcement and sentenc-
ing.16 In essence, the Supreme Court was at the heart of the crime debate 
in the 1970s, with its own political vision of crime and its corollary death 
penalty. 
The acceptance of Lockett was important for the Burger Court be-
cause it took up the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty. This 
question had already been taken up in Gregg v. Georgia, so it became 
essential to consider the importance of individual elements in these par-
ticular cases. Sandra Lockett, who physically did not take part in the 
crime, was a perfect candidate to stir up deeper discussion and debate.17 
The Lockett decision is rare when it comes to the Supreme Court. Chief 
Justice Burger’s opinion refers to the plea bargain offered three times to 
Sandra Lockett in order to uphold his stance favoring an aggravated mur-
der charge and thus the possibility of the death penalty. 
This decision in 1978 by the U.S Supreme Court was surprising fol-
lowing the moratorium and the reinstatement of executions in Gregg v. 
Georgia.18 In Lockett (and its companion case, Bell v. Ohio)19 the Su-
preme Court invalidated Ohio’s death penalty statute because it was “in-
compatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”20 
The decision was based on the fact that the defendant was not given 
an opportunity to present as mitigating factors any aspect of her character. 
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524  (1966) (holding that statements made during an
interrogation while in police custody, “without full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible 
as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”); Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (holding that “evidence obtained by unconstitutional search was
inadmissible and vitiated conviction”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963) (holding that 
in all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to counsel and that an “indigent defendant in a 
criminal prosecution in a state court has the right to have counsel appointed for him”). 
16. Fellman, David, Constitutional Law in 1959-1960, 55 THE AM. POLITICAL SCI. REVIEW 1, 
112-35 (1961). 
17. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
18. Id. 
19. 438 U.S. 637, 643 (1978) 
20. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
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The Court held that the legislature could limit what were considered ag-
gravating factors but could not limit the category of mitigating factors, 
stating that juries must “not be precluded from considering as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen-
tence less than death.”21 The Court asserted the principle of individualized 
sentencing and ruled that “the need for treating each defendant in a capital 
case with the degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far 
more important than in noncapital cases.”22 
The Lockett doctrine did not fit with all points in the Court’s previous 
reasoning. Although both Gregg v. Georgia and Furman v. Georgia are 
fundamental, Lockett v. Ohio is of a new era in the interpretation of the 
8th Amendment but also serves as a fundamental marker of a whole new 
detention and interpretative policy. 23 With particular reference to the pe-
nal state, Lockett involves an individual consideration and the analysis of 
factors inherent to each individual’s background, initiating the entry of a 
new form of law rationale relating to the death penalty. From considera-
tions of intrinsic principles to exogenous social factors, such as poverty, 
racism and violence, the Lockett case law refocuses on endogenous indi-
vidual factors such as one’s childhood, personality, situation, and motives 
to name a few. What Aristotle called the difference between equity and 
justice might be illustrated in this change in death sentencing.24 Lockett 
opened a new era. Dworkin and Hart agree that judges in hard cases fre-
quently exercise strong discretion.25 Discretion has become even stronger 
since Lockett v. Ohio. 
The Lockett decision discusses application of the death penalty but 
does not call into question its constitutionality. Rather it emphasizes per-
sonal responsibility for one’s detrimental acts against the social fabric. It 
aims to provide a better appreciation for endogenous personal factors. One 
may criticize the fact that it places responsibility fully on the criminal 
while excluding certain elements of the American history; it negates soci-
ety’s joint responsibility for poverty and exclusion by emphasizing free 
will. The decision also represents a balance of power between politics and 
21. Id. at 604. 
22. Id. at 587. 
23. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
24. See Allan Beever, Aristotle on Equity, Law, and Justice, 10 LEG. THEORY 33, 33-50 (2004); 
Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119 
(1942); Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994). 
25. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967). 
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law—though the law also was influenced by policy. Following the Fur-
man judgment for instance, states gained clearer legislative provisions; 
legislative revisions have provided states more clarity. From a political 
perspective, the neoliberal current within the Republican party has been 
very influential. Neoliberals desire to renew the country following the 
early liberal tradition of John Locke and Adam Smith—the triumphant 
capitalism of the 19th century. Neoliberalism emphasizes the individual 
in conformity with the Lockean principle that individual choices trans-
cend states imposing law: “every man has a ‘property’ in his own ‘per-
son’. This nobody has any right to but himself.”26 According to this think-
ing, people have inherent rights that preempt government, and 
governments exist to protect these rights. 
Locke’s principle of individuation differentiates the self from others. 
This idea forms the conceptual basis and logical continuity of the Lockett 
decision. Indeed, it follows naturally from the logic of the 1973 Roe v. 
Wade decision made by the Burger Court.27 This new societal orientation 
based on neoliberalism has promoted the adoption of new public manage-
ment principles aligned with public choice theory. In essence, this ap-
proach viewed human behavior as essentially self-interested.28 The ne-
oliberal position does not pose the “market against the state,” or even the 
ideal of “more market, less state.”29 Rather, it supports a particular kind 
of state. 
At the end of the 1970s and 1980s, along with the neoliberalism ide-
ology came positions of monetarism and supply-side economics, which 
appealed to the Reagan administration. Active and punitive security poli-
cies were deployed and disseminated in order to circumscribe insecurity, 
be it concrete and physical, or be it a vague and obscure feeling exacer-
bated for the political purpose of conquering the electorate based on a dis-
course of the necessity of further repression of violence. The penal state 
was thus reinforced and consolidated. This security policy generated a 
tenfold increase in the resources of prison administrations, in parallel with 
the privatization of prisons managed by private companies, which quickly 
appeared to be active and present on the stock market. In 1983 for-profit 
confinement unfolded. Prison administrations thus started to become the 
26. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 116 (1690). 
27. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
28. John M. Kamensky, Role of the “Reinventing Government” Movement in Federal Manage-
ment Reform, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247, 247 (1996); See also Richard Culp Prison Privatization 
Turns 25, U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY READER 183, 183-210, (2011). 
29. JAMIE PECK & ADAM TICKELL, CONCEPTUALIZING NEOLIBERALISM, THINKING 
THATCHERISM, IN CONTESTING NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN FRONTIERS 26-50 (2007).  
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third largest employer in the United States30, with major political conse-
quences and constant pressure on the issues and the exercise of justice. 
Garland describes this new policy as a “reinvention of the prison.”31 
Institutions were largely discredited between 1960 and 1970. They again 
became a pillar of the social order with the decline of the rehabilitative 
perspective in favor of the incapacitate one. It was therefore a global, so-
cietal transformation. The punitive approach to law and order holds the 
punitive economy as a central pillar for prisons. The managerial model 
turned away from penal welfarism to move towards neoliberalism under 
the support of President Reagan. As Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell ex-
plain: “Only rhetorically does neoliberalism mean ‘less state’; in reality, 
it entails a thoroughgoing reorganization of governmental systems and 
state-economy relations.”32 In this sense, the relationship between the ju-
diciary branch and politics has become fundamental, particularly when it 
comes to the death penalty. 
Lockett v. Ohio raised more questions about mitigating factors as it 
provided a new framework by redefining its search for a viable standard 
in death penalty cases. Nevertheless, it left the door open to wide inter-
pretation. On the other hand, this trend in using the death penalty, with the 
consideration of individual and vague elements Lockett allowed, led the 
legislator of the federal states to reiterate and re-conceptualize the notion 
of aggravating factors as an interpretative legislative check on the judici-
ary by circumscribing the possibilities for interpretation while either re-
ducing the prosecutor’s possibilities for a capital punishment application 
or reinforcing the options for charging. A series of significant cases in the 
1980s provided some clarification on Lockett’s scope with a Supreme 
Court’s relatively clear-cut approach on the legal rationale 
B. The Contours of the Lockett Principle 
Eddings v. Oklahoma falls within the ideological line of Lockett. The 
Supreme Court states that it now applies “the rule in Lockett to the cir-
cumstances of this case.”33 This decision allowed the Supreme Court to 
define more precisely the contours of the jurisprudence thus established 
by the Lockett decision concerning mitigating factors. This 1982 decision 
30. WACQUANT, LOÏC, PRISONS OF POVERTY 47-54 (2002). 
31. David Garland, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 14 (2001). 
32. Peck & Tickell, supra note 29, at 26.
33. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113 (1982). 
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clarifies the concept of mitigating circumstances in the Lockett ratio de-
cidendi. 
In this case, the defendant Eddings, 16 years old at the time of the 
offence, had been in the lower courts convicted of first-degree murder for 
killing a police officer and sentenced to death. The Court avoids the issue 
of the constitutionality of executing a juvenile. The sentencing judge as 
well as the state appellate court had operated on the grounds that various 
mitigating elements could not be considered as a matter of law. In Eddings 
v Oklahoma, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Powell (joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor, Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White dissenting) the Court as-
serted that “ it is to say that just as the chronological age of a minor is 
itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly 
considered in sentencing.”34 The Court reversed and considered that the 
death penalty had not been properly imposed in this case.35 The majority 
opinion held that “the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating 
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances.”36 
In Eddings, the Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Lockett 
that capital punishment must be imposed by taking mitigating factors into 
account in accordance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In this 
5-4 decision, the Court recalled the principle as stated in Lockett: “the rule 
in Lockett is the product of a considerable history reflecting the law’s ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and prin-
cipled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.”37 
Eddings v. Oklahoma thus required state courts to hear any mitigating cir-
cumstances offered by a juvenile defendant subject to the death penalty. 
Each legislature was also left to decide whether the execution of a juvenile 
was constitutional. 
To further comprehend the Lockett principle, it is also interesting to 
focus on the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice Burger, who drafted 
the Lockett judgment. Chief Justice Burger’s Eddings dissent further ex-
plained elements behind the rationale in Lockett. He listed three mitigating 
factors: the role played in the offence, the intention, and the defendant’s 
age. Chief Justice Burger states: “We therefore found the Ohio statute 
34. Id. at 116. 
35. Id. at 117. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 110. 
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flawed, because it did not permit individualized consideration of mitigat-
ing circumstances—such as the defendant’s comparatively minor role in 
the offense, lack of intent to kill the victim, or age.”38 Chief Justice 
Burger’s approach refers to the fact that it is not a problem related to the 
lack of consideration of mitigating, individual circumstances, but that this 
is a semantic consideration. In this sense, previous decisions have estab-
lished that the accused had a chaotic and problematic family background 
and an emotionally unstable personality. 
According to the dissenting opinion, these elements were indeed con-
sidered in the decisions rendered previously, even though they do not ap-
pear as clearly labeled, individual, attenuating factors. However, their im-
portance in view of the aggravating circumstances remains minor power 
in the balance assessing the required sentence. It is a question of confront-
ing the individual attenuating circumstances, comparing them with the ag-
gravating factors, and determining the most just sanction. The dissent does 
not violate the rule established in Lockett. It is therefore relevant to note 
that on the one hand this dissenting opinion opens a broad semantic direc-
tion since Burger’s position is part of an implicit consideration of ele-
ments which are not required to be explicitly stated. On the other hand, 
the reasoning applicable in situations involving the death penalty is re-
called, as well as a justification of the particular nature of the decision 
concerning Sandra Lockett who was not directly involved in the murder. 
Therefore, behind this rationale, we can understand the fundamental fac-
tors that take precedence in Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning: the role 
played in the murder as well as the intention. He deepened the arguments 
presented in Lockett and extended them to clarify the legal contours. 
Nevertheless, the decision has certain limits as to the instructions to 
be followed since the Court in Eddings did not directly establish a stand-
ard for similar cases when a sentence did not consider mitigating evidence 
in conformity with Lockett principles. From then on, Chief Justice Burger 
departed from the Court’s majority opinion in subsequent cases. 
In Skipper v. South Carolina, the defendant was convicted of murder 
and rape, but three testimonies were barred.39 These were the testimonies 
of two jailers and one visitor regarding the defendant’s good adjustment 
to his situation while in jail awaiting trial. The Supreme Court, in a unan-
imous decision following the Lockett v. Ohio40 jurisprudence and also Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma,41 reversed the inmate’s death sentence on the grounds 
38. Id. at 121-22. 
39. 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
40. 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
41. 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982). 
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that the trial court had excluded “from the sentencing hearing of the testi-
mony of the jailers and the visitor denied petitioner his right to place be-
fore the sentencing jury all relevant evidence in mitigation of punish-
ment.”42 Yet the Supreme Court was divided 6-3: Justice White wrote the 
majority opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Stevens, and O’ Connor while three justices took part in con-
curring opinion written by Justice Powell. In this concurrence, Chief Jus-
tice Burger along with Justices Powell and Rehnquist considered the ma-
jority opinions as “overly broad” and joined the reversal on the narrower 
grounds that the defendant should have been allowed to testify to defend 
himself against the prosecutor’s charges that he represented a danger both 
outside and inside prison and that he was highly likely to commit further 
crimes involving sexual abuse within a penitentiary system. This concur-
ring opinion does not rest on the reasoning established by previous case 
law.43 
The stare decisis on which the opinion in the Gardner case was based 
was the fact that due process had been denied because “petitioner in this 
case was not permitted to ‘deny or explain’ evidence on which his death 
sentence may, in part, have rested.”44 It is worth noting that once again 
the Supreme Court seems to encounter difficulties interpreting Lockett 
and thus the individuality of each situation involving a possible sentence 
of punishment is reinforced. Nevertheless, the Skipper judgment adds a 
new dimension to the Lockett doctrine. Hence, it is on individual particu-
larism that the rule of law in the Lockett judgment is reaffirmed to allow 
for the consideration of individual elements, in this case the behavior of 
the detainee during his pre-trial detention. Skipper thus extends the notion 
of mitigating factors, as interpreted by the Burger Court, to the post-crime 
period and, in relation to this, not just to the prior elements that character-
ized the circumstances surrounding the Lockett decision. “It is indeed 
novel doctrine that compliance with this advice by a defendant charged 
with capital murder becomes a ‘mitigating factor’ that the sentencing 
judge or jury must—as a matter of constitutional law—consider in passing 
sentence.”45 Thus, in the continuity of the Lockett precedent, states resort-
ing to the death penalty must take into consideration the period of pre-trial 
detention in terms of mitigating factors, that is to say ‘‘character or record 
‘‘ as the majority opinion indicates.46 
42. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 1. 
43. Id. at 9. 
44. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 11 (1977). 
45. Id. at 15 n.3. 
46. Id. at 12. 
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A per curium opinion was filed by Justice Scalia—appointed in 1986 
by President Reagan to the Court upon the retirement of Chief Justice 
Burger (replaced in his position by Justice Rehnquist)—in the 1987 case 
Hitchcock v. Dugger.47 This case concerned a death penalty statute, which 
crafted a jury and judge instruction that limited their consideration of mit-
igating factors to those which were listed. The Court unanimously held 
that it was not in conformity with Lockett and its progeny as it presented 
an exhaustive list of mitigating factors. In a unified voice, the Supreme 
Court asserted that “our cases hold that the exclusion of mitigating evi-
dence of the sort at issue here renders the death sentence invalid.”48 It 
should be noted that in this ruling the Supreme Court directly refers to the 
Lockett jurisprudence using the terms “the requirements of Lockett,” 
which may suggest that the Court operates in total consensus in the indi-
vidualization and interpretation of the scope of mitigating factors.49 Nev-
ertheless, this consensus in extending and clarifying the Lockett principle 
was not sustained over time. 
In 1988 the Court seized a case that extended Skipper. Franklin v. 
Lynaugh involved an inmate who was in a similar situation to that of the 
defendant in Hitchock, where the jury instruction relating to mitigating 
factors represented the major issue of the case.50 Here it does not relate to 
the civil party but to the defendant. The Court affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit’s sentence of death via a 6- 3 decision. Justice 
White wrote the plurality opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy 
while Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice 
Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissent in which both Justices 
Brennan and Marshall joined. The Court found no constitutional error in 
the case as far as mitigating circumstances were concerned and explained 
the legal grounds on which Skipper was based.51 
The Court asserted that the “discussion in Skipper of the relevancy 
of such disciplinary record evidence in capital sentencing decisions dealt 
exclusively with the question of how such evidence reflects on a defend-
ant’s likely future behavior.”52 It held that “the Texas capital sentencing 
system adequately allows for jury consideration of mitigating circum-
stances, and therefore sufficiently provides for jury discretion.”53 The 
47. 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 487 U.S. 164, 170 (1988).
51. 476 U.S. at 8. 
52. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 178. 
53. Id. at 166. 
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Court reiterated that each state has its own discretion in the scheduling of 
mitigating circumstances for the attention of the jury and that it “has never 
held that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction 
telling the jury to revisit the question of his guilt as a basis for mitiga-
tion.”54 Even though Skipper had extended the Lockett doctrine to the in-
mate’s record in detention for mitigating circumstances, Franklin v. 
Lynaugh does not confer further rights to inmates.55 Parker v. Dugger is 
a continuation of the Lockett legacy and its application in the individual 
character of the death penalty. 56 This case included a situation that is not 
uncommon to states that are defined as “weighing state[s]” (i.e., where 
state legislation enumerates a list of both aggravating as well as attenuat-
ing circumstances).57 Per this type of legislation, the death penalty can be 
imposed when the aggravating circumstances significantly surpass the 
mitigating factors regarding both the crime and the criminal.58 Many 
states took an approach similar to that of Florida during this period. In 
Parker, under the legislation of the state of Florida, per Fla. Stats. §§ 
921.141 (2) and 921.141 (3), the judge can determine the sentence solely 
by referring to the aggravating circumstances following a jury’s recom-
mendation. consider any attenuating elements. 
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, ruled for Parker in a majority 
opinion by Sandra Day O’Connor, which Justices Marshall, Stevens, 
Blackmun, and Souter joined. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. 
The Court considered that the position adopted by the State of Florida was 
arbitrary and inconsistent with its jurisprudence, stating that “the Florida 
Supreme Court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to treat ade-
quately Parker’s nonstatutory mitigating evidence.”59 Based on Lockett 
case law, the Court reiterated all the major roles played by appellate courts 
in relative cases involving a possible sentence of death and they accentu-
ated “the crucial role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the 
death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally.”60 
The Court examined the issue of mitigating factors, considering the 
difficulty of their assessment. It stated that “nonstatutory evidence, pre-
54. Id. at 165. 
55. Id. at 183. 
56. 498 U.S. 308, 318 (1991). 
57. Id. (Referring to the following statutes: Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(5) and 921.141(6) (1985 and
Supp. 1990). 
58. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985). 
59. 498 U.S. at 308. 
60. Id. at 321. 
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cisely because it does not fall into any predefined category, is considera-
bly more difficult to organize into a coherent discussion.”61 The Court 
stated the that several elements fell within this framework: “finally, nu-
merous witnesses testified on Parker’s behalf at the sentencing hearing 
concerning his background and character. Their testimony indicated both 
a difficult childhood, including an abusive, alcoholic father, and a positive 
adult relationship with his own children and with his neighbors.”62 The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant was denied meaningful ap-
pellate review when the Florida Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the 
availability of non-statutory mitigating evidence by confirming the orien-
tation of its Lockett case law, on the basis of which, “[w]hat is im-
portant . . . is an individualized determination on the basis of the character 
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.”63 The Court then 
remanded the case. 
Another feature of Lockett case law concerns the prerogatives of 
states regarding decisions on the death penalty. This element, presented 
in the dissenting opinion, reveals a certain erosion of the concept of coop-
erative federalism. This concept faces major difficulties, particularly 
within the Supreme Court’s approach and with the legal and political con-
ceptions driving then recently appointed Justice Scalia. 
Several appointments of Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court were 
part of President Reagan’s desire to influence the Court in accordance 
with his 1980 election campaign agenda. This influence began with the 
appointment of Arizona Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme 
Court in 1981. The President then decided to elevate a conservative Jus-
tice, William Rehnquist, to the position of Chief Justice in 1986 when 
Warren Burger retired. Much political attention and debate occurred after 
this elevation. Reagan filled Justice Rehnquist’s role as an associate jus-
tice with Antonin Scalia. Additionally, in 1988, Anthony Kennedy re-
placed Justice Powell. 
By 1991, Reagan’s appointees’ influence over the Court was funda-
mental, especially regarding the legal conservatism of Justice Scalia. In 
1982, Scalia stated in the Harvard Journal of Law and Policy, “the deci-
sion concerning which level of government should have the last word is, 
therefore, a pragmatic one, to be determined by the practicalities of the 
matter.”64 Notably, in 1950, Edward Corwin, for whom the conception of 
61. Id. at 318. 
62. Id. at 314. 
63. Id. at 321. 
64. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 19-20 
(1982). 
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cooperative federalism resulted in ever expanding federal power, which 
impacted state sovereignty, had expressed a major concern regarding the 
challenge of institutional relations in the future. In his article The Passing 
of Dual Federalism, Corwin asked whether, given the new federal domi-
nance, states could even be salvaged “for any useful purpose.”65 
The dissenting opinion in Parker v. Dugger, made it possible to ini-
tiate an answer. It takes the form of a “do-over” in favor of states in the 
face of over-invasive federalism. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that in this habeas corpus 
review, the majority had given “far too little deference to state courts that 
are attempting to apply their own law faithfully and responsibly.”66 
Yet, the consensus ended in 1990 thus starting to expose the Court to 
fissures on the doctrine of stare decisis correlated with the Lockett ruling. 
II. A FISSURE IN THE LOCKETT DOCTRINE FROM THE SUPREME COURT
TO STATES 
Lockett v. Ohio redefined the search for a viable standard in death 
penalty cases, and raised more questions about mitigating factors as it pro-
vided a new framework. This trend in the sentencing of the death penalty, 
with the consideration of individual and vague elements led the legislator 
of the federal states to reiterate and re-conceptualize the notion of aggra-
vating factors as a legislative check on judicial interpretation. The new 
laws circumscribed the possibilities for interpretation by either reducing 
the prosecutor’s possibilities for a capital punishment application or rein-
forcing the options for charging. Political considerations and controver-
sies appeared in the politics–law relationship, particularly around rulings 
generated in the wake of Lockett in order to determine their impact and 
significance. It is a question of analyzing the excesses of the ultra-safe 
speech both in a perspective of conquest of public opinion or satisfaction 
of the electorate. 
A.  The End of Consensus, Beyond and Back to stare decisis 
A doctrinal consensus of the Supreme Court under Lockett that lasted 
for more than a decade began to erode in Penry v. Lynaugh.67 In this judg-
ment, the Court addressed two questions. The first was the conformity of 
its execution regarding the Eighth Amendment and an accused having 
65. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-24 (1950). 
66. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 324 (1991).
67. 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). 
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mental disabilities. Penry’s psychological evaluations revealed that his 
overall intelligence was that of a child aged 6 and a half years and that he 
had a social age of a child aged 9–10 years.68 The second issue was con-
nected to Lockett and its case law. On this point, the Court considered 
Penry’s claim that under Texas law, the death penalty was unconstitu-
tional because his mental retardation was a mitigating circumstance. In 
Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court delivered its first decision regarding 
the execution of offenders with mental retardation. This decision was im-
portant due to its abandonment of “mental age” as a useful forensic con-
cept.69 Indeed, the term “mental age” was considered insufficient for a 
categorical Eighth Amendment rule. Regarding the execution of a con-
victed murderer with mental retardation, the Court offered “no direction 
home,”70 opting for a vague position by indicating that “the Eighth 
Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally re-
tarded capital murderers.”71 On this point, the majority opinion ruled that, 
“So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence 
of mental retardation in imposing a sentence, an individualized determi-
nation whether ‘death is the appropriate punishment’ can be made in each 
particular case.”72 
In Lockett case law, the plural majority opinion reaffirmed the need 
to consider attenuating circumstances because: 
[T]he jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned 
moral response’ to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision, as 
is required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Lockett, 
Eddings, and subsequent decisions. Those decisions were based on the 
68. Id. at 307–08.
At a competency hearing held before trial, a clinical psychologist, Dr. Jerome Brown, tes-
tified that Penry was mentally retarded. As a child, Penry was diagnosed as having organic 
brain damage, which was probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth. Penry was tested 
over the years as having an IQ between 50 and 63, which indicates mild to moderate re-
tardation. Dr. Brown’s own testing before the trial indicated that Penry had an IQ of 54. 
Dr. Brown’s evaluation also revealed that Penry, who was 22 years old at the time of the 
crime, had the mental age of a 6 1/2-year-old child, which indicated that, “he has the ability 
to learn and the learning or the knowledge of the average 6 1/2-year-old kid.” Penry’s 
social maturity, or ability to function in the world, was that of a 9–10 year old. Dr. Brown 
testified that, “there’s a point at which anyone with [Penry’s] IQ is always incompetent, 
but, you know, this man is more in the borderline range.” 
69. Ian Freckelton QC, Offenders with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: Sentencing 
Challenges after the Abolition of Execution in the United States, 23 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 
321, 321-35 (2016). 
70. Michael L. Perlin, “No Direction Home”: The Law and Criminal Defendants with Mental
Disabilities, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 605, 605-12 (1996).  
71. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 305. 
72. Id. at 340. 
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principle that punishment must be directly related to the defendant’s per-
sonal culpability, and that a defendant who commits crimes attributable 
to a disadvantaged background or emotional and mental problems may 
be less culpable than one who has no such excuse.73 
This is a reaffirmation of the constitutionality of the death penalty because 
crime-related facts as well as the influence of endogenous and exogenous 
criminal factors and their impact on the criminal and his act are consid-
ered. The Court stated that there was “[an] absence of instructions inform-
ing the jury that it could consider and give effect to a petitioner’s mitigat-
ing evidence of mental retardation and abused background by declining 
to impose the death penalty.”74 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice Scalia began to create distance from 
Lockett case law by declaring in his concurring and dissenting opinion 
that, “in providing for juries to consider all mitigating circumstances in-
sofar as they bear upon (1) deliberateness, (2) future dangerousness, and 
(3) provocation, it seems to me Texas had adopted a rational scheme that 
meets the two concerns of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”75 His 
criticism of the majority opinion is clear when he refers to “an unguided, 
emotional ‘moral response’ that the Court demands be allowed—an out-
pouring of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a defendant’s life 
and personality, an unfocused sympathy.”76 
Walton v. Arizona caused a major split in the Supreme Court when 
Justice Scalia led a direct, major confrontation of the Lockett doctrine and 
its subsequent jurisprudence by constructing his opinion as a fundamental 
disagreement with the premises put forth in Penry.77 Justice Scalia refuted 
the overly vague definition of mitigating circumstances as individualized 
in the Lockett ruling, which has since been articulated via stare decisis. 
Justice Scalia clearly stated his belief that there was major disagreement 
between Lockett and Furman, with the former creating an arbitrary assess-
ment due to the individualization of the mitigating factors, latter precisely 
denouncing the arbitrary aspect of the death penalty. 
Thus, per Justice Scalia, the effects of this legacy included a lack of 
coherence and a failure of the Court to achieve a uniform and rational 
system of capital punishment that followed the intention of Furman.78 
This resulted in a suspension of the death penalty, including a retroactive 
73. Id. at 304. 
74. Id. at 303. 
75. Id. at 358-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
76. Id. at 359-60. 
77. 497 U.S. 639, 690 (1990). 
78. 408 U.S. at 239. 
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effect and readjustment by national laws to achieve more precise criteria 
for compliance with the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, in this major and 
profound reversal, Justice Scalia indicated that he would not comply with 
the Lockett principle and would no longer defend contentious situations 
under the Eighth Amendment, which would limit the discretionary power 
of lower courts. Thus, in the logic of his previous opinions, Justice Scalia 
referred to state sovereignty and an appreciation of the mitigating aspect 
of circumstantial factors in the context of a case involving capital punish-
ment. The Supreme Court’s opinion was problematic: 
The majority’s failure to address the conflicting principles governing 
state death penalty statutes and the narrow split between the Supreme 
Court justices in Walton v. Arizona are likely to further confuse, rather 
than resolve the concerns of, state legislatures as to what is constitution-
ally required when sentencing capital defendants to death.79 
Following the Furman decision, the Supreme Court attempted to combat 
discrimination in judgments and the notion of using arbitrary elements 
against the black community in the United States (which was overrepre-
sented not only among those executed but also among victims) by imple-
menting an outline and instructions that would help eliminate these ele-
ments. Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Thomas in 1993 after President 
George H. W. Bush appointed the rather conservative justice to the Su-
preme Court. Thomas decided to no longer consider Lockett as a reference 
in the matter of the death penalty but to return to Furman in Graham v. 
Collins.80 
Justice Thomas’s Supreme Court opinions have been based upon 
originalism and thus have correlated with natural law yet have varied, de-
pending on the case. His judicial philosophy has been characterized by 
applying the approach of a color-blind Constitution. While the different 
ways in which Justice Thomas approaches constitutional questions are un-
derstandable. Given “his life experiences, the inconsistent originalism that 
results is itself a policy choice.”81 Although this approach ensures that 
Justice Thomas will not go against his personal beliefs regarding inherent 
equality in racial cases, it causes him to apply strict originalism systemat-
ically to other issues.82 
79. Lori L. Nader, Walton v. Arizona: The Confusion Surrounding the Sentencing of Capital
Defendants Continues, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 508 (1991). 
80. 506 U.S. 461, 470 (1993). 
81. Clarence Thomas, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 
1438 (2008). 
82. Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’ Rights Juris-
prudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1331-33 (1999).  
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In Graham v. Collins, granting Graham a writ of habeas corpus 
would result in the creation of a constitutional rule, which would in turn 
require a special instruction to the jury to consider the extenuating cir-
cumstances as presented by the defense.83 Justice White delivered the 5–
4 majority opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Thomas filed a con-
curring opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals by ruling that to support Graham’s petition would in-
deed create a new constitutional rule extending beyond the reasoning of 
the precedents that were in place at the time of the conviction. In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Thomas seized the opportunity to express his ju-
dicial conception of the doctrine of Lockett. 
For Justice Thomas, the purpose of this decision was to end the arbi-
trator’s role in a specific context after the implementation of the Civil 
Rights Act. “Furman v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused 
with concern about race bias in the administration of the death penalty—
particularly in Southern States and most particularly in rape cases.”84 
Above all, it was intended to counterbalance the well-known effects of 
discrimination against African Americans. As he indicated in his opinion, 
the unquestionable importance of race in Furman is reflected in the fact 
that three of the original four petitioners in the Furman cases were rep-
resented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. This 
representation was part of a concerted ‘national litigative campaign 
against the constitutionality of the death penalty’ waged by a small num-
ber of ambitious lawyers and academics on the Fund’s behalf.85 
This originalist interpretation of Lockett now implies that the intention is 
no longer the same: ”We cannot carry on such a business, which makes a 
mockery of the concerns about racial discrimination that inspired our de-
cision in Furman.”86 
The individualized nature of the award is notable when considering 
that individual factors de facto deprived the black community of the mit-
igating historical factors that are associated with recent segregation. These 
elements were ultimately dismissed by also individualizing the crime and 
disempowering society to reinforce the notion of individual choices being 
linked to individual trajectories based on the conservative political ap-
83. 506 U.S. at 476. 
84. Id. at 479. 
85. Id. at 481. 
86. Id. at 500. 
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proach that advocated for democracy and a society without discrimina-
tion. 
In the judgment of Justice Thomas, one can see a rejection of positive 
discrimination yet an increased emphasis on free arbitrariness of the hu-
man being beyond explanatory environmental mitigating factors. The fol-
lowing cases, in the context of the Lockett legacy on the issue of extenu-
ating circumstances, focused on a jury instruction regarding mitigating 
factors. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court again heard the Penry case,87 
which was known as Penry II.88 They ruled that a nullification instruction 
did not allow the jury to give “full consideration and full effect to mitigat-
ing circumstances” when determining the most appropriate sentence.89 
The same position was shared in Smith v. Texas, in which the Court cited 
Penry II in a 7-2 per curiam opinion and ruled that instructing the jury to 
return a false answer to a special issue to avoid a death sentence did not 
allow them to fully consider Smith’s relevant mitigating circumstances.90 
In 2004, the Court considered the question of age as a mitigating cir-
cumstance making the death sentence impossible in Tennard v. Dretke,.91 
In a 6–3 decision written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that Ten-
nard’s mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to 
his crime. The Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently 
allow the jury to weigh Tennard’s mental retardation in his favor. 
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that the execution of 
persons with limited intellectual capacity constituted a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment because it represented major mitigating circum-
stances but left the states with an appreciation of the notion of mental re-
tardation.92 This interpretation and return to national legislation were con-
firmed in 2014, when Hall v. Florida adopted the term “intellectually 
disabled” to replace “mentally retarded.” 93 This reduced the state’s mar-
gin of discretion regarding this element in relation to capital punishment. 
The majority opinion asserted the following: 
In Atkins v. Virginia, we explained that impaired intellectual functioning 
is inherently mitigating: ‘[T]oday our society views mentally retarded 
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’ 
Nothing in our opinion suggested that a mentally retarded individual 
87. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
88. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 784 (2001). 
89. Id. at 797. 
90. 543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004). 
91. 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004). 
92. 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
93. 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014). 
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must establish a nexus between her mental capacity and her crime before 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing her is triggered. 
Equally, we cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is 
not relevant mitigating evidence—and thus that the Penry question need 
not even be asked—unless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the 
crime.94 
Clearly, we are witnessing a complex relationship between the discretion-
ary power of the state and the directives of the Supreme Court, where am-
biguity prevails on this point. Each party readjusts, with the states doing 
so per constraints that are specific to them, including popular sovereignty, 
which is of major importance at the local level. 
B.  Lockett’s Legacy and its Contemporary Political and Legal 
Challenges 
The Lockett principle has strengthened the discretion of the judges 
and the jury, as well as discretion in individualizing the mitigating factors. 
This approach is of great importance to the American constitutional prac-
tice of the jury as an institution. The case Ring v. Arizona has also rein-
forced the importance of a jury and, when the evaluation of the sentence 
involves examination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 
necessity of entrusting case decisions that could lead to the death penalty 
to a popular jury and not to a judge.95 The arguments put forward by the 
Court reference the arbitrary aspect of applying the death penalty when a 
judgment is rendered by a judge. Nevertheless, in continuity with the Su-
preme Court’s case law, the decision resurfaces in this perspective on pro-
cedural harmonization of the whole question raised by the Furman deci-
sion,96 one that Gregg97 and the individualization of the mitigating 
circumstances of Lockett’s jurisprudence seemed to have spread for sev-
eral decades.98 Beyond the debate’s new beginning, it is apparent that re-
garding the application of the death penalty, the entire political relation-
ship in the exercise of the institutions displaces the issue of 
individualization and harmonization with a question of power relations 
between state and federal institutions. 
In an 8–1 decision in Kansas v. Carr (only Justice Sotomayor dis-
94. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287. 
95. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
96. 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972). 
97. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). 
98. 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
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sented), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not re-
quire juries deciding capital cases to be informed that mitigating circum-
stances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the previ-
ous sentence was in conformity with the Eighth Amendment as it did not 
violate the principle of “individualized sentencing determination.”99 The 
Court’s very broad approach is consistent with relevant case law, yet it 
differs from its traditional approach in similar cases in the sense that very 
few referrals are made to previous jurisprudence. Written by Justice 
Scalia, the opinion opts for text-focused methodology. It is not surprising 
that the decision is based on this procedure given Scalia’s position on the 
Lockett case, which is no longer stare decisis; instead, he skips to Furman. 
The central issue is that the merits of the case focus on the notion of rea-
sonable doubt and jury instruction on the subject of mitigating factors. 
The scope is thus differentiated from the notion of mitigating factors and 
their place in the procedure. 
The question of intervention or interference in the autonomy of the 
federated states as a major institutional stake in the entirety of American 
constitutional history, beginning with the debates of the federalist and 
anti-federalist factions. Some states fundamentally began by adopting the 
concept of judicial override, allowing the judge to go against the jury’s 
sentence in favor of execution in cases where the jury pronounces the 
death penalty. 
Unlike federalist judges who according to the Constitution “shall 
hold their offices during good behavior” and therefore once appointed and 
confirmed serve until their resignation, retirement or death, state court 
judges are subject to an effective removal power exercised by the peo-
ple.100 Indeed, they must face voters. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
stated: 
the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intui-
tions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to 
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed.101 
As Kenneth Culp Davis underlined: 
the reality is that nearly all [the prosecutor’s] decisions to prosecute or 
not to prosecute. . . and nearly all his reasons for decisions are carefully 
99. 136 S.Ct. 633, 644 (2016). 
100. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1. 
101. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1909). 
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kept secret, so that review by the electorate is nonexistent except for the 
occasional case that happens to be publicized. The plain fact is that more 
than nine-tenths of local prosecutors’ decisions are supervised or re-
viewed by no one.102 
The cases which receive a wider public attention are those with a death 
penalty or life sentence charge. As the Supreme Court held in Imbler v 
Pachtman, prosecutors are totally immune for any activity considered to 
be “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 
103 Even though the principle of prosecutorial immunity has been chal-
lenged several times, it is still in effect and also clearly appears in the Rule 
3.8 of the American Bar Association.104 
Accountability to the electorate is thus fundamental and their satis-
faction essential. As more than 95% of county and municipal chief pros-
ecutors are elected, it is evident that the electoral process operates and 
influences the Judiciary.105 In Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia also em-
phasized that “under our system of government, the primary check against 
prosecutorial abuse is a political one.”106 As Hamilton pointed out in Fed-
eralist Paper No. 70, “The ingredients which constitute safety in the re-
publican sense are a due dependence on the people, and a due responsi-
bility.”107 The fact that prosecutors and judges of the national courts are 
subject to popular sovereignty through elections leads to a difficult sepa-
ration of powers and an impact on elements that divide the electorate. 
With regards to this as far as the death penalty and where the Lockett v. 
Ohio jurisprudence is concerned, both the concept of judicial override in 
situations with respect to the constitutional application of Lockett’s juris-
prudence and the fundamental role played by prosecutors are underlined. 
As Justice Sotomayor noted while dissenting in Woodward v. Alabama, 
there is no evidence that criminal activity is more heinous in Alabama 
than in other states, or that Alabama juries are particularly lenient in 
weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The only answer 
that is supported by empirical evidence is one that, in my view, casts a 
cloud of illegitimacy over the criminal justice system: Alabama judges, 
who are elected in partisan proceedings, appear to have succumbed to 
102. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 207-08 (1969).  
103. 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a 
Prosecutor, American Bar Association. 
 105. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 
734 (1996). 
106. 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988). 
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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electoral pressures.108 
The rate of judicial overrides is therefore correlated to election years for 
judges. 
A study conducted by Reuters reviewed 2,102 state Supreme Court 
rulings on death penalty appeals from the 37 states that heard such cases 
over the past 15 years.109 The study connected the results in those cases to 
the way each state chooses its justices: “in the 15 states where high court 
judges are directly elected, justices rejected the death sentence in 11 per-
cent of appeals, less than half the 26 percent reversal rate in the seven 
states where justices are appointed.”110 “There are men all over the U.S. 
who are going to die because of politics. That’s a basic component of the 
death penalty,” said Tim Young, director of the Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender.111 Until 2016, there were three states where judicial override 
was in force, namely Alabama, Florida, and Delaware. The Supreme 
Court struck down Florida’s capital sentence in January 2016 on the 
grounds that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find 
each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.”112 In response, the 
Florida legislature eliminated override power in March of 2016,113 and the 
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated its own override system on August 
2, 2016.114 
In 2017, the Alabama legislature passed a statute banning judicial 
override that came into effect on April 11, 2017.115 However, the statute 
does not have a retroactive effect, so each accusation and detention occur-
ring prior to this statute might be subject to judicial override.116 Judges in 
Alabama have reserved the right to override jury verdicts.117 In Colbert 
108. Id. at 408. 
 109. Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, In States With Elected High Court Judges, A Harder Line 
on Capital Punishment, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Sep. 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investiga 
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County, for example, Circuit Judge Hal Houghston Jr. had the final say 
by sentencing the defendant Benjamin Young to death using his judicial 
override power on March 13, 2018.118 Meanwhile, in the Stephen Stone 
Case, the trial is set for January 28th, 2019.119 In late August of this year, 
the defense requested that the Madison County circuit judge not apply ju-
dicial override on the grounds that the law “fails to directly address the 
circumstances here: Specifically, a case where a defendant is charged . . . 
prior to April 11, 2017, “but neither convicted, nor sentenced before April 
11, 2017. . . Mr. Stone falls into this gap created by the Statute’s ambigu-
ity.”120 However, Madison County Circuit Judge Pate replied, “the Court 
finds that there is no prohibition against judicial override in this case.”121 
In a recent interview with AL.com, Madison County Chief Trial Attorney 
Tim Gann reaffirmed this position saying, “It is our opinion that this case 
predates the law and we believe that judicial override still applies.”122 
Clearly, the issue of judicial override in death penalty cases remains un-
resolved and will fuel political and judicial debate for years to come. 
III. CONCLUSION
Four decades later, the evolution of the Lockett principle and its her-
itage underscores the interpretative problem of a lengthy but imprecise 
jurisprudence. Lockett v. Ohio has exposed the difficulties inherent to sat-
isfying a volatile and ambiguous electorate. Indeed, it raises broader fun-
damental questions regarding law and politics. 
The Lockett case and its progeny paralleled the climax of neoliberal-
ism which marked the following decade. In terms of mitigating factors, it 
has been difficult to define them or their impacts on a fair trial. Crime 
analysis has shifted from the circumstances to the criminal, establishing a 
difficult balance between aggravated circumstances and mitigating fac-
tors. The Supreme Court has provided some clarification and attempted to 
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counter this arbitrariness. However, these clarifications have occurred in 
a nonlinear and vague manner. The current Supreme Court is further di-
vided in its appreciation of mitigating factors and individualization in 
2018. This situation raises concerns about the norm of stare decisis related 
to the Lockett rule, its conflict with Furman’s objective, and its contra-
dicto in adjecto. 
In this period of confusion and conflicts, even though judicial over-
ride is no longer characterized as a constitutional practice, the principle of 
non-retroactivity places it at the core of issues related to the death penalty 
and the individualization of mitigating factors. The jury’s emotional re-
sponse may conflict with its moral response. The tendency towards leni-
ency may contradict public opinion seeking greater stiffness. The notion 
of the “government of judges when it comes to capital punishment opens 
up another perspective. In this particular situation, this viewpoint com-
bines the notion of popular sovereignty and its corollary, direct represen-
tation, creating the controversial notion of a government of judges by the 
people. Here, Bickel’s counter-majoritarian difficulty and Ackerman’s 
theory of dualism come into play. With a pivotal appointment in the Su-
preme Court in 2018 and more to come in the future, the predictability of 
an unpredictable institution may lead to a more partisan Court. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s influence certainly will not lead to controversial orienta-
tions, but it might provide a more precise vision of Lockett’s legacy. 
